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ARTICLES
Filled Milk, Footnote Four & the First
Amendment: An Analysis of the
Preferred Position of Speech After the
Carolene Products Decision
Elizabeth J. Wallmeyer*
INTRODUCTION
In 1923, Congress passed the “Filled Milk Act,” (hereinafter
the “Act”)1 which prohibited interstate shipment of skimmed milk
made with anything other than milk fat.2 A company was indicted
under the Act for manufacturing and shipping a product called
Milnut, which contained skimmed milk and coconut oil.3 When
the case reached the Supreme Court, all the producers of Milnut
wanted to do was to be able to continue to produce and ship its
product across state lines. The producers argued that the Act
violated Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.4 The
*

Elizabeth J. Wallmeyer is currently the Assistant Director of the Virginia Freedom of
Information Advisory Council, a legislative agency of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
She graduated magna cum laude from the University of Florida College of Law. While
attending law school, she concurrently received a master’s degree in Journalism and
Mass Communications. Her graduate studies focused primarily on media law and First
Amendment jurisprudence.
1
Filled Milk Act, Pub L. No. 67-513, 42 Stat. 1486 (1923) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§
61–63 (2000)).
2
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 61–63. The Act defined filled milk as milk, cream, or skimmed
milk to which any fat or oil other than milk fat had been added, which resulted in a
product that imitated milk. See id. § 61. The congressional rationale underlying the Act
was that filled milk constituted an adulterated food, the sale of which was fraud to the
public and injurious to the public health. See id. § 62.
3
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 146 (1938).
4
See id. The Milnut producers argued that the Act invaded the field of action reserved
for state regulation by the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, which states that
powers neither delegated to the federal government by the Constitution nor prohibited by
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producers lost their argument,5 but their case impacted
constitutional jurisprudence in a manner which far transcended the
realm of economic regulation. The resulting decision affected
individual liberties, civil rights, and general questions concerning
judicial activism and standards of review.
This profound impact arose not from the text of the decision,
but the now-famous Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene
Products Co.6 Written by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, the footnote
has been labeled the most famous footnote in constitutional law.7
Justice Stone proposed the idea that a bifurcated standard of review
existed for legislation, and that a narrower presumption of
constitutionality existed when legislation appeared to fall within a
specific prohibition of the constitution.8 In the context of First
Amendment jurisprudence, this concept of heightened
constitutional review became known as the “Preferred Position
Doctrine,”9 meaning that attempted regulation of First Amendment
freedoms was presumptively unconstitutional.10 The notion of a
preferred position was embraced by the Court in First Amendment
cases, although not without controversy, for about a decade after

the Constitution to the states are reserved for the states. See id. See also U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
5
See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 154. The Court held that the Act was a
constitutional exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.
6
Id. at 152 n.4.
7
See Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred Position of
Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 277, 277 (1995). Linzer suggests that only two other footnotes have had such
an impact on constitutional law: footnote eleven of Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954), which cited social science and psychological research
supporting that the segregated education was not “separate but equal,” and footnote ten of
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966), in which Justice William Brennan
proposed the theory that Congress could expand the constitutional guarantees of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments (the Enabling Clauses), but could not
contract them. See Linzer, supra, at 277 n.2.
8
See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
9
See MATTHEW D. BUNKER, JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA 24 (1997); Linzer, supra note 7,
at 290.
10
See BUNKER, supra note 9, at 24.
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the Carolene Products decision, until it faded away after a scathing
attack of the doctrine by Justice Frankfurter in a 1949 case.11
This Article will briefly examine the status of the First
Amendment and standards of review used before the Carolene
Products decision in Part I. In Part II, the Carolene Products
decision, along with the history of the writing of Footnote Four,
will be explained. Part III will examine the cases during the 1940s
that utilized the preferred position doctrine. Part IV will examine
the First Amendment in the 1950s, when the Court appeared to
retreat from the preferred position doctrine. Next, Part V will look
at the various theories that have emerged in an attempt to explain
the rationale behind Justice Stone’s famous footnote. Finally, Part
VI will examine the current standard of strict scrutiny in an attempt
to analyze whether it embraces similar values as the preferred
position doctrine, or is a distinct means of examining First
Amendment questions.
I.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT PRIOR TO CAROLENE PRODUCTS

Today, freedom of speech appears to be treated as special, both
“constitutionally and culturally.”12
The First Amendment,
however, received little attention from the federal courts prior to
World War I, and occupied a marginal status in constitutional
law.13 In fact, until 1931, no one had won a First Amendment case
in the Supreme Court.14 A notion of a special status for the First
Amendment began to gradually emerge in the Supreme Court prior
to Carolene Products’ Footnote Four, although the emergence of
such a status was more implicit than in the later preferred position
cases.15 This Part will briefly outline key Supreme Court cases
impacting the First Amendment near the turn of the twentieth
century and prior to Carolene Products.
11

The “preferred position” label was first used in Justice Stone’s dissent in Jones v.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter’s attack
appeared in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
12
G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free
Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 300 (1996).
13
See id.
14
See Linzer, supra note 7, at 300.
15
See White, supra note 12, at 301–02. See also BUNKER, supra note 9, at 21.
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A few notable Supreme Court decisions around the turn of the
twentieth century did not address the First Amendment directly,
yet provide insight into how the Court might interpret individual
liberties and regulations of those liberties. In Robertson v.
Baldwin,16 the Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute
conferring jurisdiction on justices of the peace to apprehend
missing seamen and return them to their vessels.17 The Court
considered whether the statute might violate the Thirteenth
Amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude.18
The Court concluded that by abolishing slavery, Congress did not
intend for the Thirteenth Amendment to apply to servitude to the
Navy.19 The Court stated that the law was well settled that the
framers of the Constitution did not intend for the Bill of Rights to
present novel ideas, but instead codified the “guaranties and
immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors.”20
The Court went on to state that the Bill of Rights included
exceptions to those principles.21 As an example, the Court cited
the First Amendment.22 This amendment, the Court explained,
provided for freedom of speech yet implicitly incorporated
exceptions for speech that was libelous, blasphemous, obscene,
indecent, or injurious to public morals or private reputations.23
These exceptions were those that the Court recognized in the
common law prior to the adoption of the First Amendment.24
Therefore, any regulation concerning these presumably
incorporated exceptions would not require a special or exacting
judicial scrutiny, but would be justified restraints on speech.
This idea that a restraint or regulation on a liberty such as
freedom of speech would only be examined under a reasonableness
standard was affirmed in the 1905 case of Jacobson v.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

165 U.S. 275 (1897).
Id. at 277.
Id. at 280–81.
See id.
Id. at 281.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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Massachusetts.25 There, the Supreme Court addressed whether
mandatory state vaccinations were a constitutional infringement on
individual liberty.26 The Court held that individual liberties, while
important, “may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be
subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable
regulations . . . .”27 While this case may contain “the germ of the
idea that civil liberties could be restricted only with some showing
of necessity”28 because of the “great dangers” language, it
nonetheless also asserts that such regulations must only be
reasonable.
The First Amendment was explicitly tested in Patterson v.
Colorado,29 when a newspaper publisher was convicted for
publishing cartoons and an article seen as embarrassing to the
Colorado Supreme Court in its consideration of pending cases.30
The Court treated the case as a Fourteenth Amendment due process
claim, and viewed the regulation as an exercise of state police
power, and thus not a violation of the First Amendment.31 Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, however, speaking for the majority, stated
in dicta that the purpose of the First Amendment was to prevent
prior restraint, and not the subsequent punishment of speech.32
An interpretation more analogous to current views of the
position of the First Amendment began to emerge during the
World War I era,33 when Congress passed legislation aimed at

25

197 U.S. 11 (1905).
See id. at 12.
27
Id. at 29.
28
BUNKER, supra note 9, at 21.
29
205 U.S. 454 (1907).
30
See id. at 458–59.
31
See White, supra note 12, at 311 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment had not yet
been read to incorporate the First Amendment to include state regulation abridging
freedom of speech or freedom of the press). But see Patterson, 205 U.S. at 464–65
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that a First Amendment claim was a national claim).
32
See Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462 (dicta).
33
See White, supra note 12, at 312. White credits Zechariah Chafee, Jr., as supplying
First Amendment jurisprudence with its new philosophical rationale for protecting
speech, by turning the focus away from the individual interest in self-expression towards
a social interest in protecting democracy by facilitating truth in the marketplace of ideas.
White draws these conclusions from Chafee’s 1920 treatise Freedom of Speech. Id. at
316.
26
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criminalizing speech designed to undermine the war effort.34 The
Espionage and Sedition Acts led to a number of freedom of speech
cases that made their way to the Supreme Court, and gave the
justices the opportunity to focus on the First Amendment. It is
these World War I cases that began to lay the roots for the notion
of a preferred position for freedom of speech.35
In Schenck v. United States,36 Justice Holmes, writing for the
majority, formulated the clear and present danger test.37 The case
involved an anti-war group which mailed pamphlets to men
eligible to serve in the military, asserting that the draft violated the
Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of involuntary servitude.38 The
government argued that such pamphlets violated the Espionage
Act, which forbade obstruction of military service.39 Justice
Holmes upheld the convictions because he believed that they
presented a threat to national security. In justifying the conviction,
however, Justice Holmes went beyond the standard of mere
legislative reasonableness.40 Instead, he dictated that the question
is
in every case . . . whether . . . the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is
a question of proximity and degree.41
Justice Holmes continued to refine this test in a dissenting
opinion in Abrams v. United States.42 The majority upheld the
conviction of a group who distributed pamphlets criticizing the

34

See Espionage Act, ch. 30, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917); Sedition Act, ch.
75, Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553 (1918). This legislation occurred during a period in
American history known as the First Red Scare.
35
See BUNKER, supra note 9, at 21; Note, Of Interests, Fundamental and Compelling:
The Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U. L. REV. 462, 465–66 (1977).
36
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
37
Id. at 52.
38
See id. at 49–51.
39
See id.
40
See BUNKER, supra note 9, at 22.
41
See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added).
42
250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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United State’s involvement against Russia’s Communist Party.43
In reaching this decision, the majority utilized a “bad tendency”
test which punished speech if it was of a type that would tend to
bring about harmful results. This bad tendency was less protective
than Justice Holmes’s clear and present danger test.44 At the time
of the case the United States was at war with Germany, not Russia;
Holmes noted this fact in his dissent arguing that the Court should
have overturned the convictions because the pamphlets did not
constitute a clear and present danger.45
In Abrams, Holmes opined that the government could only
restrict speech if there was a “present danger of immediate evil or
an intent to bring it about . . . . Congress certainly cannot forbid all
effort to change the mind of the country.”46 In addition, Justice
Holmes introduced the marketplace of ideas theory as a
justification for protecting speech. He wrote that “the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.”47
The Supreme Court again upheld the conviction of an
individual associated with the Communist Party in Whitney v.
California.48 Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, wrote a
concurring opinion that read more like a dissent than a
concurrence.49 Brandeis advocated the use of the clear and present
danger test, and stated that the enactment of a statute did not
foreclose the application of such a standard.50 He implied that a
court could require more than a showing of reasonableness in its
analysis of the constitutionality of a statute that might violate free
speech. Justice Brandeis voted to uphold the conviction on a
43

Id. at 623–24.
See id. at 628–29 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
45
See id (Holmes, J., dissenting).
46
Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
47
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
48
274 U.S. 357 (1927) (involving prosecution under a California statute prohibiting the
teaching, aiding, or abetting of violence to affect political change, and not prosecution
under a federal act.
49
See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1011 (5th ed.
1995).
50
See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
44
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technicality, however, since Mrs. Whitney had appealed her
conviction on due process grounds, and not as a violation of the
First Amendment.51
Despite that a majority of the Court did not immediately
embrace the clear and present danger test,52 the two justices’
continued advocacy of the test as if it were law raised a heightened
awareness of the role of the First Amendment in both society and
the law. By introducing the theory of the marketplace of ideas—an
idea introduced by early philosophers such as John Stuart Mill that
truth would best be discovered through robust debate of all
opinions—into the realm of the First Amendment, Justices Holmes
and Brandeis were able to open the door to a stricter analysis for
any government infringement on the freedom of speech. Based
upon the market theory, if the government regulated speech, it
would hinder debate and therefore hinder the search for the truth.
Such a notion provided a basis for the assertion that First
Amendment scrutiny should involve more than a rational or
reasonableness test,53 as was explicitly articulated in Footnote Four
of Carolene Products.54
Outside of the scope of the clear and present danger test, the
Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the
unconstitutionality of prior restraints in Near v. Minnesota,55 a
decision which also influenced the Carolene Products Footnote
Four.56 In Near, a newspaper publisher printed articles with antiSemitic overtones criticizing local officials.57 The publisher was
convicted under a state statute which allowed a court to enjoin
from publication any malicious, scandalous, or defamatory

51

Id. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See White, supra note 12, at 321. Despite the efforts of Holmes and Brandeis, a
majority of the Court continued to equate the clear and present danger test with the more
traditional bad tendency test.
53
See BUNKER, supra note 9, at 22 (citing C. WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL
REVIEW 247 (1986)).
54
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
55
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
56
See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citing Near, 283 U.S. at 713–14, 718–20,
722).
57
See Near, 283 U.S. at 704.
52
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periodical.58 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction as an
infringement upon the First Amendment and labeled the statute
“the essence of censorship.”59 The Court recognized that one of
the primary purposes of the First Amendment was to prevent prior
restraints; therefore, there could be very few exceptions to this
principle.60 Implicit in this pronouncement was that any prior
restraint would be presumed to violate the First Amendment, and
would therefore require a much higher standard than rational
review to overcome this presumption.61
Up to this point, the Court had flirted with the notion that
regulations affecting the freedoms guaranteed by the First
Amendment or protection of the values it espoused62 would require
a more exacting standard of judicial review. It would take the
Court’s grappling with economic issues for this idea to be
enunciated in Footnote Four of Carolene Products, which will be
discussed in the following Part.
II.

CAROLENE PRODUCTS AND BIFURCATED REVIEW

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Carolene
Products was significant in its implications for both economic
regulations and individual liberties. This Part will briefly outline
the economic history leading to the decision in order to put the
case in context for the reader, and will then focus on the
development of the famous Footnote Four.
A. The Economic Road to Carolene Products
Since the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision of Lochner v. New
York,63 the Court had embraced a laissez faire attitude towards
58

Id. at 701–02.
Id. at 713.
60
See id. at 716 (noting possible exceptions might include information affecting
national security, obscenity, or incitement to violence).
61
See BUNKER, supra note 9, at 23.
62
As mentioned in the prior discussion, the marketplace of ideas had begun to be used
as a theory for protecting the freedom of speech. In addition, the Court enunciated that a
core purpose of the First Amendment was to protect against prior restraints. See Near,
283 U.S. at 733.
63
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
59
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regulation of the economic market. The Lochner Court struck
down a statute which limited the number of hours a baker could
work.64 The Court found the statute unconstitutional, as it
interfered with the liberty to contract between an employer and an
employee.65
The majority rejected the state’s arguments that the regulations
were underscored by legitimate health and safety concerns, and
had a rational basis.66 Justice Holmes, dissenting, believed that the
Court was imposing its own economic theory upon the state by
invalidating the statute.67 Such an action would arguably fall
under the guise of legislating, not adjudicating, and thus violate the
separation of powers doctrine. Justice Harlan, the other dissenter,
accepted the statute as a valid health regulation, citing the
legislative evidence supporting the measure.68
The principle that emerged from Lochner was that the Court
would willingly void any legislation that it saw as infringing upon
free enterprise.69 Such an approach, known as the substantive due
process doctrine, is the means by which the Court voided
economic and social legislation that affected the liberty to
contract.70 Substantive due process refers to the practice of a court
determining that a given regulation is invalid not because it
violates a specific constitutional provision, such as the First
Amendment, but because it deprives individuals of life, liberty, or
property without due process.71 The doctrine of substantive due
process became a powerful tool of judicial review for the Court,
for it allowed the Court to infer an unconstitutional process for
laws that violated substantive due process, thereby curtailing
Congressional authority.72 As states and the federal government
64

Id. at 63.
See id. at 64.
66
See id. at 53.
67
See id. at 65 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
68
See id. at 71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 49, at 376.
70
See id. at 375.
71
See generally id. at 346–62 (providing a discussion of the doctrine of substantive due
process).
72
This practice has been criticized as overstepping the Court’s boundaries and entering
into the realm of legislation. For example, when the Court ruled that the government did
65
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attempted to regulate economic and social life in America, many of
the justices believed they had an obligation to protect the economic
marketplace from intrusion, and substantive due process gave them
the means by which to accomplish this goal.73
The Great Depression marred the laissez faire economic market
and challenged the tenets of an unregulated market.74 In 1933,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced the “New Deal,” which
provided an abundance of social and economic government
regulations and controls. This economic activism, however, ran
headlong into the Court’s adoption of substantive due process,
creating a legislative and judicial showdown. The spring before
Carolene Products reached the Supreme Court, the makeup of the
Court changed, and “the grip of the Court’s business-protecting
block was irretrievably broken,”75 leading the way for a shift in the
judiciary’s economic position. The Carolene Products decision,
discussed in detail below, ushered in the Court’s new approach to
economic legislation. This approach essentially abandoned prior
notions of substantive due process.
B. The Carolene Products Decision and Its Impact on Individual
Liberties
In Carolene Products, the Court faced the constitutionality of
the Filled Milk Act, which prohibits the interstate transportation of
not possess the power to establish a maximum number of hours that an employee can
work in a week, it decided on the grounds that Congress passed the law by an
unconstitutional process. Therefore, any government regulation involving the ability of
employers and employees to set the terms of employment would be void under the
constitution, thus eliminating the ability of the state or federal government to deal with
these employment-related problems. See id. at 375–76.
73
See id.
74
See BUNKER, supra note 9, at 17.
75
Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1093, 1094 (1982). Lusky, a clerk for Justice Stone at the time of the Carolene
Products decision, noted that Justice Black succeeded Justice De Vanter. Id. In addition,
the Court during this period ran into President Roosevelt’s “Court Packing Plan,” an
attempt to allow Roosevelt to appoint more justices who embraced his policy of
economic activism by appointing a new justice every time a judge of retirement age
chose to stay on the bench. While this proposal was still pending, the Court made an
apparent retreat from its position on the constitutionality of the economic legislation.
This retreat has become known as the “switch in time that saved nine.” See BUNKER,
supra note 9, at 18.
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filled milk products.76 Under the outdated notions of substantive
due process, the Court almost certainly would have found the Act
unconstitutional, as it infringed on the free economic marketplace.
In fact, the trial court found that the indictment against Carolene
Products failed to state a claim, based on the authority of another
case in the same court.77 In Carolene Products, the defendant
argued that the statute was beyond the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce.78
The Court found that the regulation was in fact a valid exercise
of legislative power and upheld the statute.79 It cited congressional
findings that included evidence of an extensive commerce in
substances made of condensed milk from which the butterfat had
been extracted.80 In its place, vegetable oil was substituted, and
the resulting substance looked and tasted like milk.81 The product
was lower in cost, but lacked the vitamins and nutritional elements
found in regular milk.82 This substitution was therefore fraudulent
and endangered the health of the public, thus making the Act a
reasonable response to the problem at hand.83
The Court justified the constitutionality of the Act based on the
extensive congressional record.84 The Court broadened the reach
of the opinion, however, and pronounced a general presumption of
constitutionality for commercial legislation.85 Justice Stone, for
the majority, wrote:
Even in the absence of such aids, the existence of facts
supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless
in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it
is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 61–63 (2000).
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 146 (1938).
See id.
See id. at 147.
See id. at 149 n.2.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 149.
See id. at 152.
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rests on some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators.86
Justice Stone attached his Footnote Four to this statement. The
footnote consists of three main ideas: first, that a narrower
presumption of constitutionality exists when legislation addresses a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those set forth in
the Bill of Rights; second, that legislation restricting the political
process of bringing about the repeal of undesirable legislation
might be subject to a narrow presumption of constitutionality; and
third, legislation aimed at insular minorities might be subject to
stricter judicial review. The first paragraph of the footnote is most
relevant to the instant discussion of the First Amendment. The text
of the entire footnote is as follows:
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears
on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation
which restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial
scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations
enter into the review of statutes directed at particular
religious or national, or racial minorities; whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.87

86
87

Id.
Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
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The second two paragraphs of the footnote appeared as the
entire Footnote Four that Justice Stone initially circulated to the
justices.88 The first version did not mention the Constitution, but
spoke to the dynamics of government and the interplay of the
Court’s appropriate place in the scheme of government.89 Chief
Justice Hughes responded to the draft, asking whether the
considerations were really different, or whether the “difference lies
not in the test but in the nature of the right invoked?”90 Hughes’s
implicit assumption was that the recognition of certain rights by
the Framers might legitimize a more intrusive standard of judicial
review.91 As a result of this comment, Stone revised the footnote
to its published form.92
Footnote Four was adopted by only four members of a reduced
Court, with Justices Cardozo and Reed taking no part in the
decision,93 but this vote of four gave the opinion and the footnote a
majority in a Court of seven. Justice Butler concurred in the result,
affirming the conviction for violation of the Act, but did not concur
in the reasoning of the majority.94 Justice Black, a newly
appointed justice who would eventually become known as a First
Amendment absolutist,95 concurred in the majority opinion but for
the third section, which contained Footnote Four.96 Justice Black
expressed concern that such judicial action might exceed the

88

See Lusky, supra note 75, at 1096. Lusky, as Justice Stone’s law clerk, drafted this
first version of the footnote. See also Linzer, supra note 7, at 281. Lusky’s original draft
began by stating, “Perhaps the attacking party bears a lighter burden where the effect of
the statute may be to hamper the corrective political processes which would ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of unwise legislation.” Id. (citing LOUIS LUSKY, OUR NINE
TRIBUNES: THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN AMERICA 183, 185 (1993)). Stone struck
out this sentence, but kept the remainder of Lusky’s ideas. See id.
89
See Lusky, supra note 75, at 1096.
90
Id. at 1097.
91
See id. at 1097–98 (suggesting that because of this specific mention, Justice Hughes
meant that the ordinary dynamics of government and scope of judicial review did not
play a role in their review).
92
See id. at 1098.
93
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 155 (1938).
94
See id. (Butler, J., concurring).
95
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 49, at 994.
96
See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 155 (Black, J., concurring).
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Court’s powers of review.97 Justice McReynolds dissented without
writing a separate opinion.98 Therefore, only Justices Stone,
Hughes, Brandeis, and Roberts expressly adopted the language of
Footnote Four, and Justice Brandeis would retire before the
preferred position doctrine had a chance to be implemented in any
subsequent First Amendment cases.
III.

THE EMERGENCE OF A PREFERRED POSITION IN FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

Justice Stone’s notion of a preferred position for certain rights
began to impact the Court shortly after its pronouncement. The
position grew stronger and was mentioned frequently in the decade
following Carolene Products, only to fall out of grace after Justice
Frankfurter’s attack on the footnote in his concurrence in Kovacs v.
Cooper.99 Throughout the decade, controversy arose over the
authority to administer a heightened scrutiny standard, most
notably in the sparring between Justice Stone and Justice
Frankfurter.100 While Justices Stone and Frankfurter provided the
most prominent division on the Court over the role of judicial
review in relation to the First Amendment, other justices also
played key roles in the adoption and subsequent apparent dismissal
of the doctrine.
The first use of the Footnote Four principle occurred the very
next year in the Court’s 1939 decision in Schneider v. State.101 By
an eight to one vote, the Court invalidated a series of local
ordinances preventing the distribution of handbills on streets and
sidewalks.102 Justice Roberts, a member of the four-person
Carolene Products majority, wrote the opinion.103 His reasoning
did not explicitly mention Carolene Products, but it embraced the
97

See Lusky, supra note 75 at 1097 n.20 (citing correspondence from Justice Black to
Justice Stone expressing concern over the scope of judicial review).
98
See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 155.
99
336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
100
See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Preferred Position
Debate, 1941–1946, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 39, 70 (1987).
101
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
102
See id. at 165.
103
See id. at 153.
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principles set forth in Footnote Four. He wrote that a municipality
may enact regulations in the interest of public health, safety, or
convenience, but it could not abridge individual liberties secured
by the Constitution.104 If legislation did infringe on these liberties,
the Court “should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged
legislation,”105 and should “appraise the substantiality of the
reasons advanced in support of the regulation.”106 Therefore, the
Court implicitly adopted the idea that legislation impeding upon
First Amendment rights does not carry with it a presumption of
constitutionality. Justice Reed, who took no part in the Carolene
Products decision, appeared to latch on to the Carolene majority’s
approach to judicial review, as did Justice William O. Douglas and
surprisingly, Justice Felix Frankfurter, both new members of the
Court. Justice Butler also joined the majority in both result and
reasoning.
As in Carolene Products, Justice McReynolds
dissented without opinion.107 After this initial decision, the bulk of
the Court appeared to embrace the principle of a heightened
standard of judicial review for the First Amendment, which would
continue in the Court’s next examination of First Amendment
legislation.
The first explicit mention of Footnote Four came in 1940, in
Thornhill v. Alabama.108 In Thornhill, a man involved in a labor
dispute was convicted of violating an Alabama statute that forbade
picketing.109 In overturning the conviction and finding the statute
void on its face,110 Justice Frank Murphy, again for an eight-justice
majority, cited the Carolene Products Footnote Four in discussing
the importance of free speech in democracy.111 In addition,
Murphy noted that when rights such as those embraced by the First
Amendment are claimed to have been abridged, the Court must
104

See id. at 160.
Id. at 161.
106
Id.
107
See id. at 167.
108
310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
109
See id. at 91.
110
See id. at 101.
111
See id. at 95 (“[S]afeguarding of [First Amendment] rights to the ends that men may
speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed through
the processes of education and discussion is essential to free government.”).
105
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appraise the substantiality of the “reasons in support of the
challenged legislation.”112 Justice McReynolds, in his last First
Amendment case for the Court, again dissented.113
While Thornhill implicitly stated that First Amendment rights
should be viewed under stricter scrutiny than economic rights with
the “substantiality” language, the term “preferred position” was
first utilized by Chief Justice Stone in a dissent in 1942.114 In
Jones v. Opelika (hereinafter “Jones I”),115 the Court narrowly
upheld the application of a sales tax to the sale of printed materials
by Jehovah’s Witnesses.116 The Court found that when members
of the religious group utilize ordinary methods of sales to raise
money, the application of a general tax did not prohibit the free
exercise of religion or abridge speech under the First
Amendment.117 The majority held that general taxation did not fall
into the realm of the infringement of the exercise of a fundamental
right.118
Chief Justice Stone, however, speaking for Justices Murphy,
Black, and Douglas in his dissent, found that the taxation did
indeed invade the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment.119
In coining the “preferred position” phrase without specifically
mentioning the Carolene Products footnote, Justice Stone wrote:
The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding
freedom of speech and freedom of religion against
discriminatory attempts to wipe them out. On the contrary,
the Constitution, by virtue of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, has put those freedoms in a preferred
position. Their commands are not restricted to cases where
the protected privilege is sought out for attack. They
extend at least to every form of taxation which, because it
112

Id.
Id. at 106.
114
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) [hereinafter Jones I] (Stone, C.J.,
dissenting), rev’d on reh’g, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
115
Id. The case combines three cases that deal with the application of similar city
ordinances as they are applied to Jehovah’s Witnesses.
116
See Jones I, 316 U.S. at 584.
117
See id. at 597.
118
See id.
119
See id. at 600 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
113
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is a condition of the exercise of the privilege, is capable of
being used to control or suppress it.120
The Jones I decision fractured a Court that had appeared to
agree on a heightened level of scrutiny in examining legislation
infringing upon the First Amendment. This case forced the Court
to examine general legislation with a secondary effect on
constitutional rights, which was apparently not as clearly
unconstitutional as legislation addressed solely at speech. The
majority, led by Justices Roberts, Reed, and Frankfurter, who had
supported the Footnote Four proposition in Thornhill and
Schneider, retreated to a more rational level of review in Jones I.
In addition, two new members of the Court, Justices Byrnes and
Jackson, joined the majority opinion.
A year later, in 1943, the Jehovah’s Witnesses were granted a
rehearing.121 The makeup of the Court had changed, with Justice
Rutledge replacing Justice Byrnes,122 giving Stone a five-person
majority for his preferred position argument concerning the
taxation. Justice Douglas announced the opinion in the rehearing
(hereinafter “Jones II”),123 and like Stone’s dissent in Jones I, the
Court relied on the preferred position argument.124
The Court also decided two other cases addressing the First
Amendment on the same day as the Jones II decision.125 Each case
was decided with the same five to four majority that embraced the
preferred position doctrine in Jones II. Murdock v. Pennsylvania
addressed a situation factually similar to that in Jones I.126 Instead
of consolidating the case with the Jones II rehearing, the Court
decided Murdock on the grounds that because Jones I had been
vacated, the Court was free of its precedent and could “restore to

120

Id. at 608 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
See Jones v. Opelika, 318 U.S. 796 (1943).
122
See Currie, supra note 100, at 49.
123
See Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) [hereinafter Jones II] (per curiam).
124
See id. (relying on the decision in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943),
which the Court used to consolidate the Jones rehearing and two other cases because they
involved the same issues).
125
See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 105; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
126
Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106–07.
121
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their high, constitutional position the liberties”127 of those
disseminating their religious beliefs through the distribution of
literature.128 This case and Jones II, more so than the third case of
Martin v. City of Struthers discussed below, allowed the Court to
establish the idea that was general legislation with a secondary
affect on First Amendment liberties was subject to heightened
scrutiny. Justice Douglas, for the majority, made that point clear:
“it could hardly be denied that a tax laid specifically on the
exercises of [the First Amendment] freedoms would be
unconstitutional. Yet the license tax imposed by this ordinance is
in substance just that.”129
In Martin v. City of Struthers, the third preferred position case
decided on May 3, 1943, the Court addressed the constitutionality
of a city ordinance which prohibited knocking on a door or ringing
a doorbell to distribute leaflets or other circulars.130 A Jehovah’s
Witness was convicted for knocking on doors to distribute her
religious literature.131 The city attempted to justify the regulation
on the grounds that the city was an industrial community, and
many of its inhabitants worked nights and slept days. Therefore,
solicitors would cause a disturbance.132 While not expressly
mentioning the preferred position doctrine, the majority declined to
defer to the legislative findings supporting the ordinance, and
invalidated it.133 Justice Black, for the majority, wrote that the
freedom to distribute information is vital to the preservation of a
free society and must be fully preserved.134
Justices Frankfurter and Reed each filed their own dissenting
opinions.
In passing over the legislative findings, Justice
Frankfurter accused the court of overstepping its judicial
boundaries of review and entering the realm of legislation.135
Frankfurter determined that the ordinance served a legitimate and
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id. at 117.
Id.
Id. at 108.
See Martin, 319 U.S. at 141.
See id.
See id. at 144.
See id. at 147.
See id.
See id. at 154 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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reasonable end, and thus should be upheld.136 Justice Reed
dissented on the grounds that the First Amendment is not absolute,
citing obscenity, disloyalty, and provocation as established
exceptions.137 He saw this regulation as an exception to, and not a
violation of, the First Amendment.138 Justices Roberts and Jackson
joined in Reed’s dissent.
Later in 1943, the Court again addressed the preferred position
of the First Amendment in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette.139 The case arose out of a mandatory flag salute at
public schools. Again dealing with Jehovah’s Witnesses, students
of the faith were expelled from school for failing to salute the
flag.140 The students’ religion taught that the obligation of law
imposed by God is superior to the government’s law, and
considered solution the flag to be a violation of God’s law.141
They argued that the regulation denies freedom of speech and of
religion.142
In invalidating the regulation, the six-justice majority held that
the Bill of Rights withdrew certain subjects from the realm of
politics in order to “place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts.”143 Furthermore, “[o]ne’s right to life, liberty, property,
to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no election.”144 In making this bold
statement, the Court held that legislation affecting First
136

See id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See id. at 155 (Reed, J., dissenting).
138
See id. at 154 (Reed, J., dissenting).
139
319 U.S. 624 (1943). This case overruled an earlier case upholding a mandatory
pledge of allegiance in public schools. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940).
140
See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630.
141
See id. at 629. Jehovah’s Witnesses adopt a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20:
“Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image . . . : Thou shalt not bow down thyself
to them nor serve them.” Exodus 20:4–5 (King James). The Jehovah’s Witnesses
consider the flag to be an image within the context of the Exodus passage. Barnette, 319
U.S. at 629.
142
See id. at 630.
143
Id. at 638.
144
Id.
137
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Amendment rights must substantially advance a interest that the
state may lawfully protect.145 Justice Jackson, a dissenter in the
Jones II triumvirate of cases, joined Justice Stone and strengthened
the hold of Stone’s majority on the Court. Barnette, in retrospect,
would mark the high point of the Court explicitly embracing a
preferred position for the First Amendment.
Once again, Justice Frankfurter dissented, and disagreed with
the active role the majority took in reviewing the legislation. He
saw his duty as a judge not to impose his own policy, but to
“decide which of two claims before the Court shall prevail, that of
a State to enact and enforce laws within its general competence or
that of an individual to refuse obedience because of the demands of
his conscience.”146 The only question for judicial debate was
whether the legislators reasonably had enacted the law in
question.147 He admonished the majority for failing to exercise
judicial self-restraint, and did not believe that the Court had the
authority to decide that it possesses greater veto power when
dealing with one liberty over another.148 Legislators, and not the
courts, should be the ultimate guardians of liberties.149
The final case of the decade decided under the Carolene
Products Footnote Four preferred position for First Amendment
rights was Kovacs v. Cooper,150 taken by the Court nearly six years
after the busy 1943 session of preferred position cases. The court
upheld a conviction under an ordinance that prevented the use of
sound trucks on public streets.151 The Court found that the
ordinance was a justifiable exercise of the city’s authority to
prevent disturbing noises.152
The majority opinion is not remarkable; essentially, it declares
the ordinance a time, place, and manner restriction that does not
prohibit the exercise of First Amendment rights. The tenuous
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

See Currie, supra note 100, at 55.
See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id. at 648.
See id. at 649 (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)).
336 U.S. 77 (1949).
See id. at 78.
See id. at 83.
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majority in support of heightened scrutiny for any legislation
affecting First Amendment rights, either directly or indirectly,
again swung away from an across the board standard of a preferred
position. Justice Jackson returned to Frankfurter’s camp, and was
joined by Justices Burton and Vinson, new members of the Court.
Of interest in Kovacs is Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence, where
he once again attacked the authority and intelligence of delegating
a preferred position of judicial review for certain rights. He began
by calling the doctrine a “mischievous phrase”153 that had
“uncritically crept into some recent opinions of this Court.”154 He
chastised the Court for adopting as doctrine an idea set forth for
inquiry in a footnote.155 Justice Frankfurter did not abandon the
notion of more readily finding legislative invasion in the area of
free speech than in economic regulations.156 He noted that Justice
Holmes frequently followed this path by respecting individual
liberties more than “shifting economic arrangements.”157
Justice Frankfurter’s argument against the preferred position
doctrine is not centered in a lack of respect for individual liberties.
Instead, he rejects the notion of simplifying the “complicated
process of constitutional adjudication by a deceptive formula.”158
In his mind, the two seemingly conflicting notions of respecting
individual liberties and maintaining an appropriate level of judicial
activism can be reconciled. His answer to the appropriate level of
judicial review is not to enunciate a test, but instead to defer to the
legislature’s judgement so long as it does not discriminate or
prescribe which ideas may be disseminated.159
After Kovacs, the Court ceased to embrace the Carolene
Products Footnote Four or the notion of a preferred position for the
First Amendment in its subsequent free speech cases. The next
Part will examine what occurred in the First Amendment realm
immediately after the Kovacs decision with the advent of the Cold
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Id. at 90 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See id. at 91–92 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See id. at 95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 96 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See id. at 97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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War, in an attempt to discern why the preferred position fell out of
favor.
IV.

THE SECOND RED SCARE AND THE RETURN TO CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER

With the end of World War II, the United States was thrust into
the beginning of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Similar to
the period immediately following World War I and the passage of
the Espionage and Sedition Acts,160 the country entered into a “red
scare,” or a fear of all things communist. The antics of Senator
Joseph McCarthy and his communist witch-hunt launched the
nation into a paranoia. At the heart of this paranoia was a fear of
speech critical of democracy or the United States government, and
the county entered a period of First Amendment suppression.
In light of this historical backdrop, therefore, it is not surprising
that the Court backed away from a preferred position of the
freedom of speech and turned instead to perceived threats to
national security through certain citizens’ speech. In making this
shift, the Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Vinson,
returned to the Holmes-Brandeis clear and present danger test,
forgotten for over a decade.161 The Court brought back this test in
Dennis v. United States.162 Members of the Communist Party were
convicted under the Smith Act for conspiring to organize to
advocate the overthrow of the government.163 The Court affirmed
the convictions, but with no clear majority. Eight justices
participated in the case. Justices Douglas and Black, the only
remaining Kovacs dissenters on the Court, dissented, while Chief

160

See supra notes 33–48 and accompanying text for a discussion of this legislation and
resulting cases.
161
See supra notes 36–53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the HolmesBrandeis clear and present danger test.
162
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
163
The Smith Act of 1940 (also known as the Alien Registration Act of 1940) made it a
crime to knowingly advocate the overthrow of the government, to print or publish
information with the intent to cause an overthrow, or to organize a group with the
purpose of overthrowing the government. See Pub. L. No. 76-670 § 2 (a)(1)–(3), 54 Stat.
670, 671.
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Justice Vinson commanded the four-member plurality. Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson also filed concurring opinions.
Justice Vinson reintroduced the clear and present danger test to
the court,164 but in a way that gave the First Amendment much less
protection than the Holmes-Brandeis version.165 Vinson would
first require the government to demonstrate a substantial interest in
restricting speech, and would then require a showing that the
restricted speech constituted a clear and present danger.166 This
danger, however, need not be imminent and the government need
not “wait until the putsch [rebellion] is about to be executed.”167
Instead, a remote danger of a doomed attempt to overthrow the
government would be enough for Vinson to justify suppression of
speech.168 The test that emerged, therefore, was “whether the
gravity of the ‘evil’, discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”169
Justice Frankfurter criticized the clear and present danger test
as being too inflexible,170 much as he criticized the preferred
position doctrine in his Kovacs concurrence as establishing a
presumption
of
invalidity
for
legislation
touching
communication.171 He used his Dennis concurrence to once again
criticize the Court’s past use of the preferred position doctrine in
an effort to elevate the First Amendment to a level of heightened
judicial review.172 In fact, while brushing aside the preferred
position doctrine as having been casually introduced in a footnote,
he cited to the Carolene Products case to support his position that
Congressional legislation should be considered constitutional if it
had a rational basis for its adoption.173 Free speech, he said, is not
an exception to the rule that the Court’s job is not to legislate, and

164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Dennis, 341 U.S. at 501–05.
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 49, at 1014.
See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 524–25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 527 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See id. at 525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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that Congress’s acts should be respected unless legislation falls
“outside the pale of fair judgment.”174
In light of Frankfurter’s concurrence, Vinson’s plurality
opinion appears to cling to a glimmer of a preferred position for
the First Amendment by requiring a substantial interest in
regulating the speech.175 This preferred position, however, was
watered down by Vinson’s interpretation of what was required to
show a clear and present danger. It was Justices Black and
Douglas’s dissents that continued to embrace the preferred position
doctrine, even if such terminology was not expressly used.
Black asserted that judicial review for the First Amendment
requires more than reasonableness, because without such a
standard, the First Amendment would protect only orthodox
speech that did not need protection from suppression.176 He wrote
from the perspective that a preferred position for freedom of
speech was a well-established constitutional principle, essentially
ignoring the past decade of debate. He concluded that: “There is
hope, however, that in calmer times, when present pressures,
passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will restore the
First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they
belong in a free society.”177
Justice Douglas, in his dissent, also acknowledged the “exalted
position” of the First Amendment.178 Black and Douglas’s
adherence to the notion of the First Amendment as deserving a
higher standard of review is reminiscent of Holmes and Brandeis’s
continued reliance on the clear and present danger test as if it were
established law during the 1920s. Eventually, a majority of the
Court came to accept the clear and present danger test as a tool for
judicial review, as evidenced by Vinson’s use of the test in Dennis.
Likewise, Black and Douglas’s continued adherence to a special
standard for the First Amendment eventually resulted in a
heightened standard of review for restrictions on speech.

174
175
176
177
178

Id. at 539–40 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 501.
See id. at 580 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 581 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 585 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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During the period of the Red Scare, however, the majority of
the Court seemed to abandon any notion of a special position for
speech, and instead appeared to weigh the perception of any risk of
danger against the speech the government sought to suppress.179
As Justice Black hypothesized would happen in his Dennis dissent,
future Courts steered the First Amendment back to a “preferred”
position.180 It has been suggested that while the words “preferred
position” fell out of use, the substance of Footnote Four still
remained through the Court’s use of judicial tools such as a
narrowed presumption of constitutionality, strictly construing
statutes to avoid limited First Amendment freedoms, and relaxed
standing requirements.181 The next Part will examine three
theories that have emerged to explain why the preferred position
doctrine emerged and disappeared as it did, and what role it may
still play in First Amendment jurisprudence today.
V.

THEORIES SUPPORTING THE PREFERRED POSITION

Several theories have been advanced in an attempt to explain
the rationale and meaning behind the emergence of the preferred
position doctrine. This Part will explore three of those theories, as
advanced by Louis Lusky, clerk to Justice Stone during the
Carolene Products decision, and Peter Linzer and G. Edward
White, both constitutional law scholars. Each theory contains
common threads with the others, but offers different perspectives
on the creation of, and continued relevance of, the famous
Footnote Four.

179

See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (affirming a conviction for
violating the Smith Act based on the membership clause); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957) (retreating from the broad doctrine of Dennis, yet not overruling the
holding).
180
Most relevant to the line of cases arising out of Dennis and Yates is Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). In Brandenburg, the Court reformulated the
clear and present danger test to avoid any sort of balancing of free speech issues by
holding that any advocacy of violence would be protected by the First Amendment unless
inciting imminent action. This case has been cited as rejecting any deference to the
government’s actions directed at speech that may have prevailed in the Dennis balancing
years. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 49, at 1017.
181
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 49, at 994.
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A. Louis Lusky
Louis Lusky played an integral role in the creation of Footnote
Four.182 His unique perspective as a law clerk certainly can help
provide insight into the mindset of the Court during the tumultuous
period preceding Carolene Products, although his theory is not
without its own biases.183
The economic turnaround of the New Deal era presented Stone
and his like-minded colleagues an opportunity to become the
majority and guide the Court into the next decade.184 This shift
raised a curious dilemma for the new majority.185 While they had
disagreed with the prior regime of “government by judiciary”
which presumed the unconstitutionality of economic regulations,
Stone and his colleagues had taken advantage of the Court’s
adoption of substantive due process to win a few victories in the
realm of civil liberties.186 Here, as in the economic cases, a
presumption of unconstitutionality was adopted, on the grounds
that the liberties in the Bill of Rights deserved the same full
protection as the liberty to contract.187
Faced with the new majority in Carolene Products, civil
liberties became a much more difficult issue because the Court
would no longer presume economic regulations unconstitutional.
Stone chose to address this issue in Footnote Four.188 Initially,
however, Stone did not specifically mention the Bill of Rights in
the footnote, but instead chose to focus on the dynamics of judicial
review. His first draft affirmed the need for both government by
the people and government for the “whole people.”189 Stone
182

See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. As Justice Stone’s law clerk, Lusky
was involved in the footnote’s evolution.
183
See, e.g., Linzer, supra note 7, at 301 (asserting that Lusky’s personal involvement
with the creation of the text of the Footnote Four “blinds” him in his subsequent
discussions).
184
See Lusky, supra note 75, at 1094.
185
See id.
186
See id. Lusky cites as examples of these civil rights victories Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931), Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), and DeJonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
187
See Lusky, supra note 75, at 1095.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 1096.
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unhesitatingly added a paragraph to address Chief Justice Hughes’s
observation that textual rights might deserve more judicial
attention than other rights.190
The final version of the footnote, according to Lusky, arose not
as a settled standard of judicial review, but as a starting point for
debate given the new economic scheme of the Court.191 As the
Court abandoned its prior use of substantive due process to
invalidate economic legislation, questions would inevitably arise
concerning the use of substantive due process in the realm of civil
liberties. Instead of ending the debate, the footnote sought to
identify the new questions emerging on the Court, and “the modest
hope was that the Footnote would catalyze thoroughgoing analysis
and discussion by bar, bench, academe, and that a complete and
well-rounded doctrine would eventuate.”192 According to Lusky,
however, this theory underlying the footnote was never actualized,
leaving the footnote and the ideas it presented to evaporate as the
Court became involved in the issues surrounding World War II.193
Linzer’s analysis of Footnote Four, to be discussed in the next subPart, uses Lusky as a point of departure for his analysis.
B. Peter Linzer
Linzer’s argument speaks primarily to Lusky’s process-based
theory of Footnote Four, and criticizes his reliance on why the
footnote was developed instead of how it functioned to assess its
viability today.194 In closely examining the opinions passed down
by Stone and his colleagues during the preferred position period,

190

Id. at 1097.
See id. at 1098.
192
Id. at 1099.
193
See id. Lusky offers two reasons for the failure of the inquiry—the commencement
of World War II and the advocacy by Stone of issues he felt were important. Id. Lusky
asserts that Stone attempted to win over his opposition by whatever means would be
effective when he felt an issue was important, instead of unwaveringly following the path
of sound doctrine. Id. Surely a third factor could be asserted for the footnote’s alleged
failure—the untimely death of Justice Stone in 1946, leaving Frankfurter alone on the
Court to resoundingly criticize the doctrine.
194
See Linzer, supra note 7, at 278.
191
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however, Linzer draws the conclusion that Footnote Four and the
ideas it encompassed were undoubtedly substantively based.195
Unlike Lusky, Linzer does not view the internal process of
Stone’s footnote rewrite to be an attempt at positing questions for
future inquiry.196 Linzer argues that Stone and the Court did not
see the footnote as a procedural suggestion, but “treated Footnote
Four as stating a positive, not tentative, thesis, and one that dealt
not merely with process but with substantive constitutional
rights.”197 In reaching this conclusion, Linzer places emphasis on
the first paragraph of the footnote.198 Instead of relying on process
or discrimination to justify constitutional activism, as is suggested
by paragraphs two and three, Stone relied on the Bill of Rights
itself “as a charter for judicial activism.”199
Despite Justice Frankfurter’s criticism of the preferred position
doctrine, culminating in his Kovacs decision, and the subsequent
fading of the term, Linzer argues that the concept of a preferred
position has survived.200 The Carolene Products footnote helped
to establish the enforcement of the First Amendment, a practice
that became more widely accepted after the Stone Court.201 Unlike
Lusky, Linzer does not see the footnote as a starting point for
inquiry posed by Justice Stone alone.202 Instead, the footnote
recognized a combination of all of the voices of the Court.203
Stone began the footnote as an attempt to bury the outdated notion
of substantive due process. Lusky, as his clerk, pointed out that
195

See id.
See id. at 283.
197
Id.
198
See id. at 288.
199
Id. at 290. Linzer bases this conclusion on Stone’s lone dissent in Minersville School
District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). In Gobitis, the majority found a regulation
compelling school children to recite the pledge of allegiance to be constitutional, a
position later overruled in West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In dissent,
Stone articulated that explicit guarantees of freedom of speech and religion cannot be
overridden by a congressional command of loyalty. See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 601 (Stone,
J., dissenting).
200
See Linzer, supra note 7, at 299 (citing Lawrence Tribe and Gerald Gunther as also
supporting the notion that a preferred position of the First Amendment still exists).
201
See id. at 301.
202
See id.
203
See id. at 301–02.
196
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the presumptions that such a move would produce might, in some
instances, undermine the democratic process. And finally, the
Chief Justice demonstrated that this rational review, without
clarification, might ignore the nature of certain textual rights, such
as the First Amendment.204 It is through this process that Linzer
argues a substantive doctrine emerges that today functions
implicitly in the widely-accepted notion that an action by
government
that
restricts
speech
is
presumptively
205
unconstitutional.
C. G. Edward White
In White’s analysis of the Carolene Products footnote and its
progeny preferred position cases, he incorporates the Footnote into
the larger question of what led the First Amendment to “come of
age” when it did.206 He postulates that Carolene Products did not
bring about this evolution, but was instead merely a byproduct of a
“modernist consciousness” concerning freedom of speech.207 This
new consciousness included elements of both democracy and
capitalism, which he combines as elements of “modernity.”208
According to White, the idea of speech as a special liberty
deserving of special protection began to emerge in speech cases
before Carolene Products.209 Along with this development,
therefore, came the evolution of a bifurcated standard of review.210
The switch to the presumption of constitutionality of economic
regulations made the emergence of the bifurcated standard
possible, but not necessary.211 This standard was enunciated,
however, because a notion had already begun to exist that freedom
of speech was a special liberty deserving of special attention.212

204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

See id.
See id. at 302.
See White, supra note 12, at 300–01.
See id. at 301.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 302.
See id.
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As speech became more and more connected to the idea of
democracy, the Stone-Frankfurter debate during the preferred
position period illustrated that democracy could either support
majoritarian, popular policies restricting speech (the Frankfurter
approach) or could support an individual’s speech rights as the
embodiment of freedom (the Stone approach).213 Through the
many Jehovah’s Witnesses cases decided during that period, White
asserts that it became clear that Stone’s perception of speech rights
“reinforced democracy in a way that economic rights did not.”214
White’s analysis indicates that a preferred position for speech
really came to mean that First Amendment freedoms were closely
associated with the model of democratic politics that prevailed in
society.215 Implied in this notion is that unregulated capitalism
was less democratic and less preferred.216 It is interesting to note
that this shift occurred after the great depression, at a time when
faith in the unregulated economic marketplace waned. From the
judicial rubble, the notion of an intellectual marketplace of ideas
surpassed the economic model, and the preferred position doctrine,
under White’s theory, appears to have legitimized the higher
democratic values embodied in speech than in a free economy, at
least during the decade following Carolene Products. White
continues to analyze First Amendment theory throughout the
twentieth century, and also accounts for a later shift away from the
marketplace theory towards a rationale reflecting a self-fulfillment
theory of speech.217 What is important for the purpose of this
analysis, however, is that the Carolene Products decision could be
interpreted not as a major shift in First Amendment jurisprudence,
but as part of the evolution of the role of speech in society as it
“came of age.” The notion that speech was special emerged well
before Footnote Four, and the later abandonment of the preferred
position doctrine does not signal an abandonment of a special

213

See id. at 334.
Id. at 334–35.
215
See id. at 341.
216
See id.
217
See id. at 354–57 (citing THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION (1970)) (emphasizing the role of the First Amendment as a tool for selffulfillment).
214
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position for speech. Instead, Footnote Four was yet another rung
on the ladder of First Amendment evolution.
VI.

DOES THE PREFERRED POSITION DOCTRINE STILL EXIST
TODAY?

Depending on which theory one espouses explaining the
creation and evolution of the preferred position doctrine and
Footnote Four, one could argue that Stone’s preferred position has
one of three statuses: (1) the doctrine, intended to be a fluid
starting point for inquiry, was suffocated by its static application,
and faded out with the advent of World War II; (2) the doctrine is
merely a step along a continuum of First Amendment evolution
that emerged due to changing thoughts about democracy and
speech, and melded into a newer theory as perceptions of the value
of speech continued to evolve; or (3) the doctrine is alive and well,
but has become an implicit, rather than explicit, standard embraced
by both society and the judiciary.
Some argue that the third status is the most accurate
interpretation and see the preferred position doctrine as a precursor
to the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review utilized today by
the courts.218 This notion is also supported by the general
acceptance today that the First Amendment occupies a special
place in society.219 The relatively quick evolution of the First
Amendment from a tool prohibiting prior restraint to an important
individual liberty in a matter of a few decades is highlighted by the
advent of the preferred position doctrine. Even if the doctrine does
not explicitly still encase First Amendment questions, the ideas and
values promoted in First Amendment decisions during the
preferred position period continue to reappear today.
How one decides to interpret the question of a continued
existence of the Footnote Four ideas will also be partially shaped
218
See, e.g., BUNKER, supra note 9, at 22. Bunker argues that the Holmes-Brandeis
clear and present danger test provided some underpinnings of the preferred position
doctrine, and that the strict scrutiny test and the clear and present danger test can be
reconciled. Id. Logically, then, a relationship must also exist between the preferred
position doctrine and strict scrutiny.
219
See Linzer, supra note 7, at 301.
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by one’s own notions of the appropriate standards of judicial
activism. In this light, the debate over the preferred position shifts
away from the substance of the First Amendment and becomes one
of procedure. Such an inquiry extends beyond First Amendment
implications, including notions of equal protection, unenumerated
rights, substantive due process, and commerce clause powers.
While a notion of heightened scrutiny for most First Amendment
inquiries has become more widely accepted, the scope of the
footnote extends beyond the freedom of speech to encompass all
standards of judicial review.
On a theoretical level, however, White is correct in noting the
fluid nature of First Amendment theory. Present trends toward less
protection for hate speech, pornography, and indecency on the
Internet cannot be explained by a static theory of the role of the
First Amendment. Society has, arguably, moved away from a
marketplace of ideas notion that the truth is best served by
allowing all voices, no matter how repugnant the opinion. The
Carolene Products footnote, on a theoretical basis, will only
continue to be influential for as long as the theories that supported
its creation continue to be espoused in some form.
In reality, the continued relevance of Footnote Four most likely
falls between the second and third theories of its development—
that the footnote was both a step on the evolutional ladder of
interpreting the First Amendment and an implicit element in any
discussion of the First Amendment today. From a practical
perspective, the footnote did help to illuminate substantive issues.
Its reliance on the text of the Bill of Rights as a source for
heightened judicial inquiry provides a reasonable explanation for
the direction the Supreme Court has headed in First Amendment
jurisprudence since the beginning of the twentieth century.
The many complexities of the issues raised by the Carolene
Products Footnote Four escape concrete answers, but facilitate
interesting and important debate concerning constitutional
interpretation. The foundations provided by Footnote Four for
modern First Amendment jurisprudence shed light on the theory
and policy behind today’s notions of the role of freedom of speech
in society. One footnote in an economic regulations case brought
to the forefront of debate questions both substantive and
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procedural, as well as questions concerning both the meaning and
purpose of a specific amendment and broader questions as to the
role of the Court and the legislature. And the inquiry began with
just a glass of filled milk.

